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1. Introduction
Inflation dominated the policy agenda for much of the 1970s and the 
1980s. Over the next two decades, greater macroeconomic stability (the 
«Great Moderation») has confined the issue to the outer limits of the macro-
economic debate. In the light of recent developments, this was shortsighted. 
Between 2005 and the current downturn (2008-9), inflation rates and expec-
tations rose across most advanced economies, suggesting that inflation is not 
dead and continues to be worth studying it, mainly for its policy relevance 
and its impact on long-term macroeconomic performance. Shedding some 
light on unsettled aspects of past inflationary processes could also guide us in 
interpreting the current state of affairs and in identifying forces that trigger 
major inflation shocks. This paper contributes to the debate by investigat-
ing the tradeoff between inflation and output in Italy and its evolving nature, 
with a focus on the post-WWII years.
There are at least three motivations for the choice of Italy as a case study. 
The first is that this country has experienced higher than average and more 
volatile inflation rates than most other industrialized economies across a va-
riety of monetary regimes. The second is that Italy differs markedly from 
Anglo-Saxon market structures and institutions, on which the bulk of the 
Phillips curve literature has focused. Among the differences, rigidities in the 
labor market stand out. At the end of the 1960s, in step with the widespread 
union unrest in industrialized countries, Italian unions managed to impose a 
unique two-tier bargaining system – at the national and firm levels – keyed 
ECONOMIA POLITICA / a. XXIX, n. 1, aprile 2012
 Received December 2010, Approved November 2011.
 We thank participants to the AIEL 2008 (Brescia), ESAM 2008 (Wellington) and SIE 2011 
conferences, and Chris Gilbert, Patrizio Bianchi, Giovanni Pittaluga and two anonymous referees 
for very valuable comments and suggestions. An earlier draft of this paper circulated under the 
title «Wage bargaining and the Phillips Curve in Italy».
20
on an indexation mechanism called the Scala Mobile (SM). SM, inspired by 
a strong egalitarian motivation, held at centre stage until the early 1990s and 
exacerbated the inflationary process. Symmetrically, subsequent changes in 
the wage bargaining structure and in the indexation mechanism contributed, 
in addition to a tighter monetary policy, to the decline of inflation in the re-
mainder of the 1990s and eased Italian membership in the European Mon-
etary Union (EMU). Finally, the course of post-war Italian monetary policy 
was critically influenced by government financing requirements, a specific 
application of fiscal dominance (Fratianni - Spinelli, 2001b).
This paper asks whether the combination of a rigid wage indexation 
mechanism and a regime of fiscal dominance were responsible for the Ital-
ian inflation process to be significantly distinct when compared with other 
advanced countries. We evaluate this distinctiveness using the key metric of 
the inflation-output tradeoff. Methodologically, we first examine the volatil-
ity, persistence and stationarity properties of the Italian inflation rate across 
various exchange-rate regimes that have characterized post-WWII Italian 
monetary history (Fratianni - Spinelli, 2001a). Next, we estimate alternative 
Phillips equations, and study the effects of structural changes and asymme-
tries on the estimated parameters of the inflation-output tradeoff. For that, 
we rely on a time-varying parameter model estimated with a Kalman filter 
algorithm.
Our key results are as follows. The statistical properties of inflation dis-
play significant fluctuations over the post-WWII sample. Periods of fixed ex-
change rates and looser wage bargaining mechanisms, often accompanied by 
less accommodative monetary policies, were associated with lower and more 
stable inflation rates than periods characterized by more rigid labor mar-
ket regulation and flexible exchange rates. As a result, we uncover signifi-
cant evidence of structural breaks in the inflation process, which makes the 
standard, constant-coefficient approaches to the study of the output-inflation 
correlation very questionable. A fitting example is the 1972-84 period, which 
stands out as the only non-war episode of high inflation. After the demise 
of the Bretton Woods agreement, strict wage indexation made Italian wages 
sensitive to prices of imported goods, in fact contributing to importing for-
eign inflation. Furthermore, the high rate of government budget deficit mon-
etization produced expansionary monetary policies and recurrent exchange-
rate crises, while inflation shocks and uncertainty hit hardest groups whose 
incomes were less sheltered by indexation. These effects lasted in Italy much 
longer than in comparable economies, at least until 1985. In that year, Italy 
started a slow adjustment process aimed at participating first in the Single 
European Market and later in the EMU.
We gather evidence on the inflation-output tradeoff using a standard 
specification that blends the original expectation-augmented Phillips curve 
with more recent specifications based on persistence and price-wage rigidity. 
Our main finding is that both traditional OLS methods and more appropri-
ate approaches accounting for structural change yield no significant feedback 
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from cyclical economic conditions to inflation; that is, we cannot detect a 
statistically significant inflation-output tradeoff. Moreover, we find some evi-
dence that the growth in the Treasury component (i.e., linked to government 
borrowing requirements) of the monetary base is correlated with inflation. 
This result is consistent with the hypothesis that both labor market rigidities 
and a fiscally dominated monetary policy were the main drivers of Italian in-
flation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the stylized 
facts on Italian inflation, on the link between monetary aggregates and bud-
get deficits, and on the indexation mechanism. In Section 3, we analyze the 
statistical properties of the inflation rate and their constancy. In Section 4, 
we present various estimates of the inflation-output equations, using conven-
tional and time-varying methods. Section 5 discusses the main findings of our 
work and draws some conclusions.
2. Purchasing power in Italy, 1949-2010
2.1. Stylized facts
There are several ways to measure the Italian price level over the long 
run. Spinelli - Trecroci (2008) and Del Boca et al. (2010) focus on the im-
plicit price deflator of national income, cost of living and wholesale prices, 
dating back to 1861, the year of political unification in Italy. Here, we select 
the implicit price deflator, but our findings do not change significantly with 
alternative measures of the price level.
The post-WWII period is the reference sample of our analysis. However, 
it is helpful to put recent developments into a longer, historical perspective; 
therefore, we plot in Figure 1 the annual price level from 1861 to 20101. The 
graph shows that for the long 50-year spell approximately identified by the 
international gold standard the Italian price level was relatively stable and 
had limited variability. The price level soared during WWI to level off only 
in the mid-20s, when Italy plunged into the single deflationary episode of its 
history.
That episode ended with the years of WWII, during which the price 
level nearly doubled. Subsequently, the Italian price level soared, particularly 
in the seventies and in part of the eighties, yielding a third major inflationary 
interval, the only one outside war times. It is in this period that the index-
ation mechanism was put in place.
Figure 2 plots the log differences of the price level, for the years 1949 
1 All pre-1950 GDP, industrial production, population and price data come from Flora 
(1983; 1987) and Mitchell (1992; 1993), whilst data on exchange rates, fiscal variables and the 
money stock are from Fratianni - Spinelli (2001a). We checked for consistency of the post-
1950 data using standard sources, such as the IMF and OECD.
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to 2010. Three developments stand out. First, inflation was highly volatile in 
the 1950s and 1960s, when labor unions transitioned from post-war strength 
to significant weakening later in the fifties. Employment growth in the sixties 
raised union membership, also among unskilled workers. The weight of the 
latter, by the end of the sixties, grew relative to that of skilled workers, the 
traditional base of unions’ power. Second, the oil shock of 1973-4 triggered 
a sharp acceleration of the price level. At the same time, Italy experienced 
a surge in unions’ strength, massive strikes and egalitarian money wage de-
mands. In 1975, monetary policy was tightened in response to rising wage 
pressures and a deteriorating external imbalance. Wage moderation, how-
ever, lasted only for a couple of years, which likely explains why inflation 
did not fall further. Eventually, lower rates of inflation were recorded in the 
early eighties, following disinflationary policies enacted in the United States 
and the United Kingdom. Italian disinflation coincided with a decline in the 
unions’ power on wage bargaining, a loosening of the SM indexation mecha-
nism, and the establishment of an income policy that can be interpreted as 
a de facto cooperative model among employers, unions and government. 
Tighter monetary policy, mostly the result of the Bank of Italy becoming in-
creasingly independent from the government, was ultimately responsible for 
Italy’s admission into EMU.
In what follows, we first provide an account of wage bargaining con-
ditions in post-war Italy and a sketch of the fiscal dominance hypothesis, 
then present the statistical properties of the inflation rate, and finally ex-
amine the evidence for an Italian inflation-output tradeoff for the period 
1949 to 2010.
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FIG. 1. Italy, 1861-2010: natural log of the implicit price deflator of national income.
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2.2. Wage indexation in post-war Italy
SM was first established in the province of Milan in 1944; it then spread 
quickly to the rest of the country2. The aim of indexation was to protect 
wages’ purchasing power from inflation erosion. Employers initially accepted it 
to mitigate social conflict. The Italian indexation system had no exact counter-
part in other industrialized countries and reflected the relative strength of Ital-
ian workers and left-wing parties. Employment growth in the sixties expanded 
union membership, proportionally more among unskilled than skilled work-
ers (Cella - Treu, 1982). «Working-class power» peaked in the early seventies, 
when blue-collar workers accounted for 84% of manufacturing employees, 
leading to an explosion of labor strikes and an egalitarian wage policy.
SM worked by assigning a fixed lira wage increase to each percentage 
point increase in the price level index. This meant that lower money wages 
were more sensitive to price-level changes than higher money wages, a fea-
ture designed to achieve wage compression and higher income equality 
(Manacorda, 2004)3. Initially, wage indexation was less than complete. In 
2 In 1946, the indexation mechanism was extended to Northern Italy, and soon after to 
the whole country, following a national agreement signed by the unions and Confindustria, the 
Italian Employers Association. Initially calculated at a provincial level, SM became uniform 
across all sectors, with differences based on age and sex.
3 Using Manacorda’s data, the ratio of the top-decile to the bottom-decile money wage 
was 2.40 in December 1977. From January to April 1978, with an increase of 5 points in the 
SM index, the ratio fell by 3% to 2.32. 
FIG. 2.  Italy, annual inflation rate, 1949-2010. Inflation is defined as the log change of the implicit price 
deflator of national income.
1950 1955 1960 1965 1975 19801970 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
17.5
15.0
12.5
10.0
7.5
5.0
2.5
0
NYINFL
24
1975, at the peak of union power, the value of the fixed point was made 
uniform across workers and «hardened» to compensate for price-level effects 
generated by the first oil crisis. In essence, SM ended up indexing money 
wages to imported inflation4. Imported inflation was mostly the result of re-
current exchange-rate devaluations of the lira that took place since the de-
mise of the Bretton Woods system. The extent of wage indexation to price-
level changes expanded rapidly to reach full indexation and more. Modigli-
ani - Padoa Schioppa (1978), fittingly, titled their essay on Italian economic 
policy at the end of the seventies: «The Management of an Open Economy 
with “100% Plus” Wage Indexation».
The distortive effects of SM on work incentives contributed to a shift in 
favor of self-employment at the top end of the productivity distribution (Pel-
lizzari, 2009). Frustration against the equalizing effects of SM erupted among 
white-collar workers5. The pendulum then began swinging against SM. A 
first loosening of the SM impact on money wages occurred in 19836. In April 
1984, the government passed a law loosening the SM indexation adjust-
ments. In response, the Italian Communist Party and the communist-backed 
union CGIL sponsored in 1985 a public referendum to restore full coverage 
under SM. The referendum was defeated. For the remainder of the 1980s, 
a much weaker form of SM continued to operate. Confindustria, the Italian 
Employers Association, repealed SM in 1991. In 1993, the government, the 
unions and Confindustria agreed to replace SM with an income policy, the 
essence of which was to link money wages to forward-looking expected infla-
tion rates. The policy became effective the following year. In the meantime, 
the Bank of Italy, under Governor Antonio Fazio, engineered a strong dis-
inflationary policy that was the main driver of Italy’s qualification for EMU 
(Fratianni - Spinelli, 2001a, ch. 12). Italy’s experience with the euro has so 
far been characterized by a particularly disappointing productivity dynamics. 
The latter has reverberated in sluggish output growth under the one-size-fits-
all monetary policy of the European Central Bank.
2.3. Fiscal dominance
The necessary conditions of fiscal dominance require that the govern-
ment, in addition to controlling fiscal policy variables, has direct access to 
central bank financing so as to monetize a portion or the totality of its bud-
4 The 1975 Lama-Agnelli accord (after Luciano Lama, representing the three main Italian 
labor unions, and Gianni Agnelli, the head of Confindustria) reset the index at the new base 
of 100.
5 A key date is 1980, when an estimated 40,000 white-collar workers operated a strike at 
the FIAT headquarters in Turin.
6 Such were the effects of the so-called «Accordo Scotti» among employers, unions and 
government.
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get deficit. Under these circumstances, the government can raise the level 
of expenditures without at the same time raising tax rates and, thus, influ-
ence current and future flows of the monetary base and the inflation rate. 
Fiscal dominance implies an intertemporal positive correlation between 
government budget deficits and money growth (Sargent - Wallace, 1981). It 
also implies that the central bank can keep nominal interest rates «low» in 
relation to levels that are consistent with price-level stability. The low inter-
est rate policy is aimed at reducing the cost to Treasury of financing budget 
deficits.
Fratianni - Spinelli (2001a; 2001b) provide a detailed account and econo-
metric evidence that fiscal dominance characterized much of Italian monetary 
history from political unification to the creation of EMU. The height of fis-
cal dominance was reached during the sixties, the seventies and part of the 
eighties (Fratianni - Spinelli, 2001a, chs. 4 and 10). In addition to monetiz-
ing a large share of budget deficits, the Bank of Italy put in place complex 
controls and regulations to redirect national saving from the private sector 
to government. Interest rates were kept low relative to inflation rates. Banks 
were subject to ceilings on bank loans and to minimum levels of purchases 
of government securities. An intricate web of regulations prevented people 
from diversifying assets across currencies. Controls on exchange rates and 
capital movements were increasingly tightened. The broad justification for 
these actions was that they were necessary to maintain interest rates below 
the level prevailing abroad and to allow the government to finance public 
debt at a «reasonable» cost.
The low borrowing costs made it easy for political authorities to post-
pone needed adjustment. Budget deficits rose both in absolute value and 
in relation to GDP. Fiscal dominance left a legacy of fiscal profligacy and 
low credibility of the Bank of Italy. In 1981, the Treasury agreed on what is 
popu larly known as a «divorce» agreement, whereby the Bank of Italy was 
released from the obligation to buy unsold government securities at Trea-
sury’s auctions (Fratianni - Spinelli, 2001a, pp. 497-501). The agreement re-
established some of the credibility the Bank had lost during the troubled 
seventies. Central bank credibility was again lost in September 1992, when 
Italy left the European Monetary System following a severe currency crisis. 
The Maastricht Treaty of the same year and the conditions to qualify for the 
final stage of EMU imposed tight constraints on Italian policy makers. In 
the years immediately preceding the launch of EMU the Bank of Italy was 
made completely independent from the executive. Fiscal dominance largely 
petered out because the Treasury had no longer access to central bank fi-
nancing. Nevertheless, Italy’s entry into EMU gave the government access 
to borrowing on favorable terms, thus watering down the incentives for a 
fully successful fiscal consolidation and preserving Italy’s high level of pub-
lic debt.
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3. Statistical analysis of Italian post-war infl ation
Having described the evolution of wage bargaining and indexation insti-
tutions and the dominance of fiscal policy over monetary policy for much 
of the 1949-2010 period, we now focus on the inflation data. To gain some 
insight into the evolution of inflation’s statistical properties, we split the sam-
ple in 1973 and 1995, and study the resulting sub-samples. The reason for 
the split is that the lira exchange rate was fixed within the Bretton Woods 
system in the first sub-sample (1949-73), whereas in the second sub-sample 
(1974-95) it followed for the most part a «fixed but adjustable» peg within 
the European Monetary System; in the third (1996-2010) the lira prepared 
first for and then gave way to the euro in the EMU.
Table 1 displays average inflation rates (n), their standard deviations (v) 
and variation coefficients (cv = v/n) for the whole sample and the two sub 
periods.
The inflation rate was much higher in the 1974-95 sub-sample than in all 
other sub-samples, an outcome that is consistent with the intensity of fiscal 
dominance, social conflict, union bargaining power and exchange-rate tur-
bulence in that period. Inflation volatility was also quite high, whereas the 
last fifteen years witnessed a dramatic shift to the lowest and most stable val-
ues of the sample. Table 1 also shows the results of the Jarque - Bera (1987) 
(e1) and Doornik - Hansen (1994) (e2) normality tests that evaluate whether 
asymmetry and kurtosis of the series (over the full sample) conform to those 
of a normal distribution7. There is clear evidence against the null of normal-
ity for the entire sample.
It is interesting to compare these stylized facts about Italian inflation with 
those for the United States and the United Kingdom. The latter is a small, 
open economy very similar in size to Italy; like Italy, it has a long history 
of changes in monetary arrangements and a rich evolution of labor-market 
institutions. Figure 3 plots the annual inflation rates (all based on the price 
deflator of national income) of the three countries, while Table 2 reports 
7 The Jarque and Bera test has low power in small samples; the Doornik and Hansen test 
corrects for this bias.
TAB. 1. Italy, summary statistics on annual inflation rates
Sample e1 = 14.05*; e2 = 42.70**
n v cv
1949-2010 6.07 4.99 0.82
1949-1973 4.10 2.55 0.62
1974-1995 10.77 5.18 0.48
1996-2010 2.43 1.06 0.44
Inflation is defined as the log change of the implicit price deflator of national income. Mean (n), 
standard deviation (v), coefficient of variation (cv), normality tests (e1 and e2).
* and ** indicate rejection of the null at the 5% and 1% significance level, respectively.
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simple means and standard deviations of inflation rates over the two halves 
of our sample. Italian inflation has by far the highest mean and volatility. UK 
and Italian inflation rates are substantially higher and show a higher degree 
of persistence than US inflation rate, especially in the 1970s and the 1980s. 
However, after 1979 the UK and Italian experiences diverge, with the United 
Kingdom able to mop up inflation much faster than Italy.
The economic significance of these differences may be better understood 
if they are placed within the institutional context of the three countries. Ital-
ian and UK industrial relations were strikingly similar up until Mrs. Thatcher 
came to power in 1979: her government set monetary stability and low in-
flation as a priority. Legislation produced by the Thatcher’s government 
gradually reduced the national role of unions and collective bargaining (Vis-
ser - Ruysseveldt, 1996). Union representation and strike frequency declined 
sharply to well below the European average. On the other hand, UK mon-
etary authorities experimented with several institutional arrangements aimed 
at reining in inflation, such as monetary targeting and a period of «shadow-
ing the deutschemark».
TAB. 2. US, UK and Italian annual inflation rates, 1949-1998. Means and standard deviations
Sample Italy USA UK
mean SD mean SD mean SD
1949-2010 6.072 4.993 3.415 2.218 5.412 4.054 
1949-1973 4.101 2.551 2.877 1.953 4.793 2.870 
1974-1998 9.902 5.444 4.564 2.433 7.465 4.910 
1999-2010 2.178 0.883 2.149 0.802 2.427 0.657 
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FIG. 3. US, UK, and Italian inflations rates, 1949-2010.
28
The US structure of trade unionism was similar to the United Kingdom’s: 
only few unions were outside the umbrella of the American AFL-CIO or the 
British TUC. In Italy, in contrast, significant union power was lodged outside 
the major labor confederations, which were divided along political, organi-
zational, and religious lines. In the United States and the United Kingdom, 
despite declining membership, unions were able to raise members’ wages 
substantially above non-union wages. In Italy, in contrast, wage settlements 
spilled over onto the non-unionized sector with the consequence that there 
was no significant union wage differential8. National labor agreements had 
the force of law. Unions were strong and closely tied to political parties; their 
members were relatively homogeneous. In contrast, the employers’ associa-
tion Confindustria was not rooted in a «dense» institutional framework and 
had a membership with relatively heterogeneous objectives. These objectives 
differed along several dimensions, such as size of firms, industrial sectors, 
and regional location of firms.
Italy did not go through radical policy changes similar to those experi-
enced in the United Kingdom. A system of centralized wage bargaining re-
mained at the core of Italian industrial relations, an equilibrium outcome 
stemming from the interplay of strong political parties, weak governments 
(Visser, 1998) and a fiscally dominated monetary policy. Macroeconomic in-
stability manifested itself with a high and volatile inflation, accompanied by 
exchange rate devaluations and currency crises. It is no surprise that under 
such circumstances the identification of a stable tradeoff between output and 
inflation is a challenging, if not outright impossible, task.
The validity of our key empirical results crucially depends on the unit-
root properties of the inflation rate. To assess them, we now consider the 
conventional Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test for I(1) against I(0), as 
provided by evaluation of the t statistic of the bt  coefficient in:
 u1
1
t t i
i
n
t ir a nx br c rD D= + + + +-
=
-/ ,
where x is a deterministic trend. A significant statistic implies rejection of 
the null hypothesis of unit root (H0 : b = 0) and therefore stationarity of the 
inflation rate. Table 3 shows results for the full sample and for the two sub-
periods demarcated by the split in 1973; we include t-values for the b coef-
ficient for both the model with only a constant and with a constant and a 
trend, each estimated with n = 39.
The very few significant t statistics (in the early part of the sample) do 
8 Time series evidence for the 1970s and the 1980s from both the United States and the 
United Kingdom suggests that the union differential in the United States was 18%, higher on 
average than the UK 10% (Blanchflower - Bryson - Forth, 2007).
9 The critical values for this procedure depend on the inclusion of the constant or of the 
constant and a trend term. The critical values employed are from MacKinnon (1991). A statis-
tic significant at the 5% is marked by *, at the 1% by **.
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not cloud the overall result that the test fails to reject the null of a unit root 
in both models: the inflation rate appears to be a non-stationary process. 
This highlights that Italian inflation is remarkably persistent, likely because 
of pronounced macroeconomic volatility. Volatility, in turn, reflects complex 
forces operating in the economy, such as monetary and fiscal policy regimes 
and their interdependence, as well as exogenous shocks interacting with the 
macroeconomic structure. The above result also corroborates the notion that 
the statistical properties of inflation are likely to change over time. How-
ever, based on simple unit root tests we cannot determine the nature and 
frequency of the structural changes that are responsible for non-stationarity. 
Moreover, ADF tests have low power in small samples and in the presence 
of variables containing moving-average components (Maddala - Kim, 1998). 
To account for this problem, we employed the non-parametric correction to 
the t-test statistic implied by the Phillips - Perron test, which is more robust 
with respect to unspecified autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the dis-
turbance process of the test equation. The results are very close to those of 
the ADF test10.
These clear findings, while pointing to inflation being an I(1) process, 
provide the motivation from shifting our focus from the unit-root proper-
ties of the series to the possible presence of structural breaks. To this end, 
we perform a series of tests of multiple structural changes, as proposed by 
Bai - Perron (1998; 2003; see also Qu - Perron, 2006). This type of test is 
particularly suited to our case because, among other things, it is designed 
to evaluate multiple structural breaks in the context of OLS models. It pro-
vides a way of testing, using a Sup Wald-type test, the null hypothesis of no 
change in the coefficients versus an alternative containing a finite number of 
shifts. Furthermore, Bai and Perron’s algorithm permits to test the null of 
m changes versus the alternative hypothesis of m + 1 changes. We apply the 
tests to an AR specification with a constant, also accounting for serial corre-
lation and different variances in the residuals.
As shown in Table 4, the SupFT(i) tests are all significant for i between 1 
and 5; therefore, at least one break is present. The SupFT(3/2) test generates 
a value of 53.69 that is significant at the 1% level. The sequential procedure 
10 Detailed output from the test is available upon request.
TAB. 3. Italy, Augmented Dickey-Fuller test on inflation rates, various sub-samples
Inflation
sample
Constant* Constant and trend
i = 0 i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 0 i = 1 i = 2 i = 3
1949-2010 –1.77 –2.03 –1.39 –1.36 –1.77 –2.09 –1.45 –1.43
1949-1973 –3.39* –2.78 –1.73 –1.75 –3.87* –3.04 –1.99 –2.24
1974-2010 –0.64 –1.00 –0.80 –1.08 –2.86 –3.21 –2.98 –3.36
Inflation is defined as the change in the natural log of the implicit price deflator of national income.
* indicates rejection of the null with a 95% confidence interval.
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and the information criteria (both the BIC and the modified Schwarz crite-
rion) all point to three breaks. The inference is that significant shifts in the 
inflation mean span across at least four intervals; under global minimization 
the breakpoints are estimated to occur in 1972, 1982 and 1991, all with very 
narrow confidence intervals. This evidence, which is consistent with our de-
scriptive analysis, is likely to emerge from the fact that we have allowed for 
different residual variances across intervals11. Our sub-samples are presum-
ably also characterized by different degrees of inflation persistence, making 
our task of giving a structural interpretation to Italian inflation particularly 
challenging.
This evidence, together with the time-series properties of inflation, sup-
ports the conjecture that over our sample period the covariance between in-
flation and real economic activity underwent significant shifts. This reason 
plus the fact that in our relatively long sample we do not have consistent 
and sufficiently long data beyond prices, output, money and unemployment, 
make it unworkable to pursue a system estimation. While we acknowledge 
that a DSGE or a VAR, as in Dees et al. (2009), or a full-fledged cointe-
gration with VECM estimation, as in Golinelli (1998)12, facilitate inference 
in data-rich contexts, for our study of the annual inflation-output tradeoff a 
parsimonious single-equation approach is in practice the only robust option.
11 It follows that we allow for a stochastic trend instead of a deterministic one.
12 DSGE stands for dynamic stochastic general equilibrium, VAR for vector autoregres-
sion, and VECM for vector error correction model. 
TAB. 4. Tests of multiple structural change of inflation: 1949-2010
Tests
SupFT(1)
29.30*
SupFT(2)
105.02*
SupFT(3)
112.02*
SupFT(4)
84.87*
SupFT(5)
74.50*
UDmax
112.02*
WDmax
151.37*
SupFT(2/1)
55.43*
SupFT(3/2)
53.69*
SupFT(4/3)
6.37
Number of breaks selected
Sequential
3
LWZ
3
BIC
3
Estimates of the model with 3 breaks
1tt
3.84
(0.44)
2tt
15.63
(0.68)
3tt
8.28
(0.83)
4tt
2.81
(0.28)
T1t
1972
(1971:1973)
T2t
1982
(1981:1983)
T3t
1991
(1990:1992)
The table presents results of the tests proposed by Bai - Perron (1998; 2003) on an autoregres-
sive model of inflation, where the ts denote the coefficients of the lags of the dependent variable. The 
SupFT(i) tests allow for the possibility of serial correlation in the disturbances. The HAC covariance ma-
trix is constructed according to Andrews (1991) and Andrews - Monahan (1993) using a quadratic kernel 
with automatic bandwidth selection based on an AR(1) approximation. The residuals are pre-whitened 
using a VAR(1). We use a 5% size for the sequential test. In parentheses are the standard errors (robust 
to serial correlation) of the estimated coefficients and the 95% confidence intervals for the break dates.
* denotes significance at the 95% level.
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4. A Phillips curve for Italy?
To evaluate a Phillips-type relationship for postwar Italy, it is best to put 
it into the context of the literature on the inflation-output tradeoff13. A first 
strand blends the classical expectation-augmented Phillips curve hypothesis 
(Phelps, 1967; Friedman, 1968) with more recent proposals featuring persis-
tence and price-wage rigidity (Woodford, 2003). A reduced-form equation of 
the tradeoff between inflation and output is given by equation (1):
(1) *) E r+(y y 1tt t t tr c= - - ,
where y yt t- * denotes the output gap14, that is, the difference between the 
current level of output and its NAIRU or equilibrium level, and Et – 1rt the 
expected inflation rate, conditional on last period’s information. The Et – 1rt 
term embeds a rational expectations hypothesis in a structural model of 
price rigidity. Equation (1) implies that: unexpected changes in aggregate 
demand affect both inflation and output; parameter c, defining the slope of 
the curve, declines as prices become stickier; and the SM mechanism also 
reduces c, making it zero (a perfectly horizontal curve) when indexation is 
complete.
The literature has often discussed a forward-looking specification of eq. (2):
(2) ( )y y E 1t tt ttr c b r= - + +* .
Unlike (1), (2) makes the curve shift in response to revisions of cur-
rent expectations of future inflation. However, from an observational point 
of view, the difference between (1) and (2) is not so significant given that 
expected inflation rates display a high degree of serial correlation. Recently, 
some consensus has emerged on a specification that accounts for inertia and 
nominal rigidities. In the framework commonly defined as the hybrid New 
Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC), current inflation reacts to expected future 
inflation and current real economic activity, proxied by real marginal costs 
that are empirically measured by income’s labor share. The result is a model 
where inflation is purely forward-looking. However, empirical evidence con-
firms that inflation has a significant degree of inertia (Fuhrer - Moore, 1995; 
Woodford, 2003; Galì et al., 2005; Cogley - Sbordone, 2008). Building on 
these findings, most models add lagged inflation on top of a forward-looking 
13 What follows is not a complete discussion of the various Phillips hypotheses, but 
rather a synthesis of the main empirical features of the literature that are relevant to our in-
vestigation; see Cecchetti et al. (2007) and Dees et al. (2009) for concise summaries of the 
main issues.
14 We use the output gap since it is the variable that appears in standard three-equation 
macro models, and because it is the only one at hand given our data limitations.
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specification15. Finally, given the small/open nature of the Italian economy, 
it is appropriate to add the rate of change of import prices r*t  to account 
for the impact of foreign inflation on the domestic price level, impact that in 
Italy was exacerbated by the SM mechanism. Based on these considerations, 
we arrive at our preferred reduced-form equation of the Phillips relationship:
(3) ( )E y y1 1t t t t t tr b r ~r c dr f= + + - + ++ - **t t .
The parameters in (3), as for all other specifications, are nonlinear func-
tions of the underlying structural parameters.
The most important issue in the modeling of inflation is the decomposi-
tion of its dynamics between short-run variation and long-term trend. Mod-
ern macroeconomic theory argues for a close tie at business-cycle frequencies 
between the trend component and inflation expectations. Various statistical 
methods are available for the identification of this component, such as fil-
tering techniques (Hodrick-Prescott, HP; linear or band-pass filters), out-
comes from market surveys, or measures derived from inflation swaps or 
bond-based break-even inflation rates. These methods have their own draw-
backs. Inflation swaps and inflation-linked bonds have too short a history to 
be useful for us. Filtering techniques are limited by the underlying assump-
tions. For example, the two-sided HP filter makes the inflation trend depen-
dent on a perfect-foresight hypothesis. Agents’ expectations of inflation are 
a combination of some trend measure and a random component, with the 
latter, according to rational expectations, being small and unpredictable. Fil-
tering techniques, like almost all other alternative methodologies, violate this 
orthogonality condition. On the other hand, this condition clashes with the 
empirical evidence that supports adaptive inflation expectations (Fuhrer - 
Moore, 1995; Cogley - Sbordone, 2008).
Even more fundamentally, the rational expectations hypothesis underly-
ing all reduced-form and DSGE models of inflation imposes that economic 
agents know the «true» conditional probability distribution of macroeco-
nomic outcomes. Given the ubiquitous role played by uncertainty, this as-
sumption is, to say the least, troublesome. It is particularly so for macroeco-
nomic phenomena that are not stationary ergodic processes, that is, phenom-
ena characterized by sustained and unpredictable shifts, caused by institu-
tional and behavioral changes that show up in structural breaks of the esti-
mated parameters. In sum, the Italian study of the inflation-output tradeoff 
poses peculiar challenges that cannot be met with conventional approaches. 
The common approach in the literature is to posit that inflation is station-
ary and suitable for an equation like (3) to be estimated with GMM16. How-
15 Price indexation, rule-of-thumb behavior, non-linearities in price-setting mechanisms 
and time-varying trend inflation are amongst the theoretical explanations of inflation persis-
tence.
16 GMM stands for generalized method of moments.
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ever, in the presence of sustained structural changes, most often one faces 
the difficulty that there are few or no variables that can be employed to pro-
duce more reliable inflation forecasts than those generated by a simple AR(1) 
model, a fatal flaw for the conventional GMM-based approach17. The same 
applies to the widespread use of errors-in-variables techniques to modelling 
rational expectations of inflation: future actual values are used instead of 
the expected values, and GMM estimation is again employed as in standard 
dynamic rational expectations models. But relying on future actual values is 
tantamount to extracting information from the whole sample. Such a meth-
odology would be patently inappropriate in cases like Italian inflation, where 
there is clear evidence of shifts in the steady state and the presence of a sto-
chastic trend. Finally, Del Boca et al. (2010) provide evidence of convexities 
in the response of inflation to changes in the output gap, which argues for 
an approach that can treat the impact of nonlinearity.
An ideal methodology would be to estimate a multi-equation model, 
along the lines of the DSGE literature, or to adopt a VAR or Bayesian per-
spective (Dees et al., 2009; Benkovskis et al., 2011). Obvious limitations 
in our data, on the other hand, would suggest sticking to a parsimonious, 
single-equation specification, one that would account for structural changes 
and the impact of nonlinearities. To this end, we selected a comprehensive 
time-varying parameter (TVP) method (Granger - Jeon, 2008; Kim - Nelson, 
2006; Cecchetti et al., 2007)18. TVPs helps to identify the conditional infla-
tion-output tradeoff and the causal links between observed institutional or 
behavioral changes and structural shifts in the parameters. The model in its 
general state-space form is as follows (Harvey, 1989; Kim - Nelson, 1999):
(4) 
c x b e
b d T b z1 ’ 1
t t t t t
t t t
r = + +
= + ++ +
l
where 0, ,  0, ,  ,e N z N Q b N a2 0 0 0t t. . .v R^ ^ ^h h h , and xt defines a vector of the 
model’s explanatory variables. The first equation in (4) is the measurement 
or observation equation. It is the classical linear regression model except 
that the parameter vector bt (representing the state variables) is posited to 
change stochastically according to the transition described in the second 
equation in (4)19.
17 See also Dees et al. (2009) on this point.
18 Alternatively, one could insert variously defined time trends in the model. The TVP 
approach yields much richer evidence about time variation, especially about aggregate demand 
and inflation expectations. 
19 We follow the prior distribution proposed by Doan et al. (1984), which assumes that 
changes in the endogenous variable are so difficult to forecast that in the AR(1) process of the 
unobserved state vector the coefficient of its lagged value is likely to be near unity, while all 
other coefficients are assumed to be near zero. The prior distribution is independent across 
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If agents were fully informed and under no uncertainty, all parameters 
of the prior distribution would be known. If this were really the case, a se-
quence of generalized least square regressions would deliver an estimate of 
the state vector. However, such an approach is extremely inefficient com-
putationally. More importantly, we have already discussed why uncertainty 
about parameters’ true values leads to a systematic update of the parameters’ 
forecasts. Finally, estimation would have to occur even if only some of the 
parameters of the prior distribution were unknown, a necessary step to draw 
any inference about b. All these considerations lead to select the Kalman fil-
ter as the best suited to make inferences20.
Summing up, our TVP formulation involves forecasting the optimal state 
vector in each period, conditional on information available up to the previous 
period21. The computed filtered estimates of the parameters and the residu-
als for each observation in the sample account for the potential variation over 
time of the underlying parameters. The methodology presents a number of 
advantages. First, it handles uncertainty in a straightforward way, as it entails 
a simple learning process of the model’s coefficients. The uncertainty agents 
face depends upon the error variance of their past optimal forecast, which in 
turn is conditional on the joint dynamics of output and inflation. Second, it is 
methodologically parsimonious, since its implementation requires narrow pa-
rameterization compared to, say, multi-equation settings, or alternative state-
space models with regime switching. Finally, unlike most existing studies that 
ignore parameter uncertainty and nonlinearities, our approach endogenizes 
the realization of disturbances to the inflation-output tradeoff and prevents 
future information from affecting today’s inflation forecasts.
We base our inferences on two measures of trend inflation. The first uses 
the Structural Time Series (STS) approach proposed by Harvey (1989); for 
more details, see Hamilton (1994). STS involves decomposing the original 
series into trend, recursive stochastic cycles, and irregular components that 
vary over time, using again the Kalman filter22. This generates a time-vary-
coefficients, so that the mean squared error of the state vector is a diagonal matrix. We as-
sume that measurement errors and the disturbances to transition equations are serially and 
mutually independent.
20 The Kalman filter is a recursive procedure for computing the estimator of a time-t 
unobservable component, the state vector, based only on information available up to time t. 
When the shocks to the model and the initial unobserved variables are normally distributed, 
the filter also enables to compute the likelihood function through prediction error decomposi-
tion (Hamilton, 1989; Kim - Nelson, 1999). Both features are particularly suited for the treat-
ment of time variation and uncertainty in the inflation-output tradeoff.
21 Under the normality and the independence assumptions about the disturbances, the 
computation of the state vector is done with the Kalman filter.
22 This way, we extract time-varying measures of expected inflation that for each obser-
vation rely only on information available up to the point of estimation. This modelling ap-
proach is in line with a plausible learning process by both the central bank and private agents. 
Moreover, the structural time series models are parsimonious models that have reasonably rich 
ARIMA processes as their reduced forms. 
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ing trend based on low-frequency autoregressive and cyclical components of 
inflation’s DGP, based only on information available up to time t. The sec-
ond measure is based on the conventional HP filter23. Figure 4 plots actual 
inflation along with trend inflation estimated either using the Kalman filter 
(STSINF) or HP (HPINF). It is easy to spot the sizeable rise in trend in-
flation in the late 1960s, its peak between 1980 and 1983, and the marked 
decline towards the end of our sample. The two measures of trend inflation 
display quite different volatility and persistence properties, with STSINF fol-
lowing more closely inflation’s short-term dynamics, although with a lag.
We employ the STS approach to measure the output gap to account for 
changes in productivity and potential output. Time-varying potential output 
is computed by fitting a univariate model on real GDP. Each observation of 
the estimated potential output relies only on information available up to the 
point of estimation. As a robustness check, we also tried alternative measures 
of the output gap – one provided by the OECD, another estimated with the 
HP filter and a third estimated with band-pass filters – but found very little 
qualitative differences in the resulting estimates of the inflation-output trade 
off. Figure 5 plots our measure of the output gap (STSYGAP) along with in-
flation. It shows that Italian output and inflation move in opposite directions 
23 We also experimented with polynomial trends, moving averages, the kernel-based 
smoother and the natural cubic spline; their overall contribution is not significantly different 
from the HP-based measure.
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FIG. 4.  Italy, actual and trend inflation, 1949-2010. Inflation (INF), Hodrick-Prescott (HPINF) and Kal-
man-filter based (STSINF) measures of trend inflation.
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(full-sample correlation: – 0.22), particularly during major shocks, and hints 
at a non-standard inflation-output tradeoff.
We subjected STSYGAP, the rate of change of GDP and all other mea-
sures of real economic activity to ADF and Phillips-Perron unit root tests. 
Results (not reported here for brevity but available on request) support un-
ambiguously their stationarity. Therefore, while Italian inflation is a I(1) pro-
cess, as we have already seen, the output gap is I(0). Thus, it would be ques-
tionable to look for cointegration between these two variables.
Benchmark OLS estimates
We compute, as a benchmark, standard OLS estimates of equation (3) 
over the sample 1949-201024. These estimates, based on the HP and STS 
measures of trend inflation respectively, are reported below (t-values, shown 
in parentheses, are computed using standard errors that are heteroskedastic-
ity and serial correlation-consistent [HAC]):
 
*0.207
(0.80)
0.698
(2.48)
0.208
(1.61)
( ) 0.048
(1.55)
0.87
E y y
R
1 1
2
t t t
STS
t t t
STS
t tr r r r f= + + - + +
=
+ - * t
24 The existing literature suggests various ways of estimating the output-inflation tradeoff. 
Methods like instrumental variables or GMM, besides the considerations made in this Section, 
suffers from well-known lack of robustness (Muscatelli et al., 2002).
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FIG. 5. Italy, inflation (INF) and output gap (STSYGAP), 1949-2010.
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The use of HP in place of STS-based measure of trend inflation does 
make some difference for parameter estimates, but the key coefficient, the 
output gap elasticity, is always statistically insignificant across specifications. 
As evidence of the high degree of inflation persistence, the coefficient of 
lagged inflation is significant and sizeable, whilst import prices are barely so. 
These estimates therefore hint at domestic inflation being highly persistent, 
not linked to output developments25 and somewhat dependent on imported 
inflation, the latter likely reflecting recurrent exchange-rate devaluations of 
the lira26. The output-gap coefficient is never statistically significant, regard-
less of the filtering methodology employed.
Overall, this evidence is inconsistent with the implications of the standard 
tradeoff between inflation and output. This does not come as a surprise in 
light of our evidence that inflation is nonstationary and the likely occurrence 
of significant shifts in the relationship between inflation and real economic 
activity.
An additional factor that might have affected the covariance between 
output and inflation shocks is the particular role played by monetary policy. 
Fratianni - Spinelli (2001b) report several instances in Italian monetary his-
tory in which growth in the monetary base was tied to changes in the Trea-
sury’s borrowing requirements. In a famous paper, Lucas (1980) estimated a 
Phillips-type relationship with money in place of output on US data, since 
filtered data showed that inflation moves roughly one-for-one with money 
growth. This implies that inflation could react to changes in the monetary 
base, regardless of the level of real activity. We re-estimated, therefore, the 
output-inflation OLS tradeoff by replacing the output gap and imported in-
flation with the growth in the Treasury component of the money base (MB-
TES), over the sample ending in 1998 (i.e., just before EMU). Below we re-
port our estimates:
 
0.022
( 0.06)
0.828
(2.27)
10.892
(2.46)
0.85
E MBTES
R
1 1
2
t t t
STS
t tr r r fD= -
-
+ + +
=
+ - t
25 Using the first difference of GDP or industrial production or a HP-based definition of 
the output gap does not minimally alter this evidence.
26 Although we cannot rule the impact of imported inflation due to changes in relative 
prices, changes in the nominal exchange rate presumably have exerted the dominant impulse.
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Despite the sensitivity of the estimates to the definition of inflation expec-
tations, the coefficient of the change in MBTES is positive, sizeable and statis-
tically significant across specifications. This is consistent with the fiscal domi-
nance view, namely that changes in the monetary base, driven by the accom-
modation of the Treasury’s funding needs, exerted a strong impact on inflation.
Baseline time-varying parameter estimates
We now turn to the estimation of a baseline time-varying parameter 
model for the inflation-output tradeoff, with the aim of shedding some light 
on the links between institutional changes, such as the SM mechanism and 
the role of fiscal policy, and the structural shifts in the coefficients of the 
inflation-output relationship.
Figure 6 plots the times series of the estimated coefficients of equation 
(3)27. The estimates were carried out using STS-based measures of trend in-
27 For brevity, we do not show here the full results of our TVP estimation, which are 
available from the authors upon request.
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FIG. 6.  Italy, coefficient estimates of eq. (3), 1951-2010. TVP coefficients obtained using STS-based meas-
ures of expected inflation and output gap.
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flation and of the output gap28. The behavior over time of the estimates cor-
roborates the hypothesis that the inflation rate and the output gap are only 
weakly positively associated over most of the sample, with even a few years 
of negative association, albeit statistically insignificant. This result also ex-
plains why standard constant-coefficient techniques detect an insignificant 
response of inflation from the output gap. Trend inflation and, to a lesser ex-
tent, import prices, are more important determinants of actual inflation than 
cyclical conditions. Figure 7 plots the conditional forecast error variance of 
inflation, based on our model. It is a helpful gauge of the uncertainty as-
sociated with inflation, in part due to the volatility of the equation residual 
and in part to the evolution in the model’s coefficients. The figure shows 
that episodes of high inflation uncertainty occurred in the early 1960s, the 
1970s, the 1980s and at the onset of the 2007-2009 crisis. The early 1960s 
were characterized by the «Italian economic miracle», the 1970s and 1980s 
by oil shocks, the monetization of fiscal deficits, the enlargement of the SM 
indexation mechanism and later by its removal.
The vigorous output dynamics of the 1950s and early 1960s were largely 
non-inflationary, as rapid productivity gains pushed outward the Italian 
economy’s production frontier, while Bretton Woods’ fixed exchange rates 
shielded the economy from monetary and other nominal shocks. This ef-
28 Employing HP filter-based measures of the output gap does not qualitatively alter the 
results.
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FIG. 7. Italy, conditional forecast error variance of inflation from the TVP model of eq. (3), 1951-2010.
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fect faded out over time. Stronger labor unions, compliant governments, and 
distorted monetary policy, as we have discussed above, imposed severe con-
straints on firms. This assessment is consistent with the central message of 
Modigliani - Tarantelli (1976), who showed that starting with 1968 deteriorat-
ing industrial relations were responsible for an upward shifting and an ever 
steeper Phillips curve (defined in terms of inflation and unemployment)29.
We estimate a further version of the inflation equation in which, as in the 
OLS-constant-coefficient case, we replace the output gap and import prices 
with the growth in the Treasury component of the money base (MBTES), 
over the sample ending in 1998. The three panels in Figure 8 plot the re-
sulting output-gap coefficient estimate (top chart), the implied conditional 
forecast error variance of inflation (middle chart), and the rate of growth of 
MBTES (bottom chart). The relevance of Treasury-caused money growth for 
inflation is confirmed by the size and dynamics of TVP coefficient estimates 
and by the high (visual) correlation between the implied conditional variance 
of inflation and the rate of growth of MBTES.
Finally, we performed a number of robustness checks on the sensitivity 
of our results to the underlying assumptions of the estimated models. First, 
we reestimated both the conventional OLS and TVP models using alterna-
tive definitions of the output gap (HP, linear and band-pass filters, recursive 
whenever possible; industrial production in place of national income) and 
trend inflation (HP-based, polynomial trends, moving averages, kernel-based 
smoother and natural cubic spline). Although in a few cases the findings de-
parted quantitatively from the baseline results we have reported, qualitatively 
the alternative formulations did not make a significant difference. Next, we 
estimated equation (3) and its variants using GMM, in conformity with much 
of the international literature and standard dynamic rational expectations 
models. Overall, the findings were not significantly different from the OLS 
benchmark. Both GMM and OLS suffer from the shortcomings of imposing 
the assumption of constant coefficients and no structural changes.
6. Concluding remarks
It is almost heroic to establish a statistically significant response of Italian 
inflation to the level of real activity in postwar Italy. When we measure the 
output impact on inflation via standard constant-coefficient techniques, this im-
pact is statistically insignificant, possibly reflecting a statistically significant but 
negative correlation between output and inflation in the early part of the sam-
ple and a muted correlation in the latter part. This behavior has its likely roots 
29 It should be noted that in a later work Tarantelli (1978) argued that stagflation did not 
necessarily hamper the theoretical validity of a textbook-like Phillips curve, especially if the 
reaction of monetary policy to the resulting cost-push inflation was deflation. However, such 
reaction does not seem to have materialized up until the end of our sample.
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cients were obtained using STS-based measures of expected inflation.
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in output and inflation moving in opposite directions during major shocks and 
in inflation expectations being insignificant in driving current inflation. The 
exception to this pattern occurs in the period between the 1950s and the early 
1960s, when output dynamics were largely non-inflationary, by virtue of rapid 
productivity gains, and the economy was shielded by nominal shocks, by virtue 
of the Bretton Woods system. These findings broadly confirm that the stan-
dard tradeoff between inflation and output growth emerges only during pe-
riods of low inflation and relative macroeconomic stability, as shown, among 
others, in the comprehensive study by Benkovskis et al. (2011), using time-
varying VAR techniques, traditional macro models, as well as DSGE models.
We have argued that the Italian «distinctiveness» rests on two institu-
tional mechanisms: a rigid wage bargaining process coupled with an index-
ation scheme aimed at protecting real wages; and a monetary policy driven 
by dominant and profligate governments. These forces were the engine of 
persistent macroeconomic instability.
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Summary: Macroeconomic Instability and the Phillips Curve in Italy (J.E.L. E31, E32, J50, N10)
The theme of this paper is whether there was a textbook-like inflation-output tradeoff in post-WWII 
Italy. We estimate both standard and time-varying parameter models of the relationship between inflation 
and the level of real economic activity over the 1949 to 2010 period and find no evidence of a stable, 
significant and positive association between output and prices. We attribute this evidence primarily to 
a fiscally dominated monetary policy and a rigid indexation mechanism aimed at protecting wages from 
inflation. These two institutions contributed to the persistent inflation bias and macroeconomic instability 
that lasted almost until the entry of the country in the European Monetary Union.
